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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(i) Nature of the Case: 
This case arises out of a dispute of whether a deed for conveyance ofland also transferred 
a portion of an appurtenant ground water right. Respondents Jay and Cln-istine Brown (the 
"Browns") brought a declaratory and quiet title action against Appellant Augusta Greenheart 
("Greenheart") arguing that a portion of an adjudicated ground water right was not sold nor 
transferred with the sale of 60 acres ofland that Greenheart had purchased from the Brovms. 
(ii) Facts: 
On or about February 5, 1988 the Jay Brown acquired approximately 320 acres of land 
situated in the East Yz of Section 24, T4S, R5E, B.M_, in Elmore County ("Original Brown 
Property") by way of a Quitclaim Deed. [R. Vol. III, p. 538]. The Snake River Basin 
Adjudication ("SRBA") Court in Twin Falls, Idaho, decreed \Vater Rights Nos. 61-2188 and 61-
7151 (See. Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3 in Exhibits to Clerk's Record; also found in [R. Vol. L 
pp. 25-28]) to Brown on October 26, 2000, authorizing the use of groundwater to the 320 acres 
comprising the Original Brown Property. Id. Water Right No. 61-2188 was decreed authorizing 
the irrigation of up to 164 acres ofland within a permissible place of use that encompassed the 
320 acres comprising the Original Brown Property. [R. Vol. III, p. 538]. Water Right No. 61-
7151 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 123 acres ofland within a permissible place 
of use that encompassed the 320 acres comprising the Original Brown Property. [R. Vol. III, p. 
539]. 
In December of 2006, the Browns listed for sale 60 acres of their Original Brown 
Property with an asking price of $80,000, the property was listed with real estate agent Daryl 
Rhead. [R. Vol. III, p. 539]. In 2006, Greenheart spoke with agent Daryl Rhead about her interest 
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to pmchase property in the Mountain Home, and that she wanted vacant land with low taxes and 
low maintenance. [R. Vol. III, p. 540]. All cOllli11Unications bet\veen the Browns as the seller 
and Ms. Greenheart as the buyer \",ere conducted through the agent DalTyl Rhead. Id. Mr. Rhead 
was both the listing and selling agent for the 60 acres that contained the adjudicated ground 
water rights at issue in this case, however .Mr. Rhead did not testify at trial. [R. Vol. III, p. 540-
41]. 
On January 29, 2007, Defendant Greenheart and Jay Brown entered into a written 
contract to pmchase approximately sixty (60) acres of the Original Brown Propelty (the 
"Greenhemt Propelty") from the Browns, leaving the Browns with approxin1ately 260 acres (the 
"CulTent Brown Propelty"). [R. Vol. III, p. 545-546]. The two written documents comprising the 
contract between the parties include a RE-24 Vacant Land Real Estate Pmchase and Sale 
Agreement and an RE-13 Counteroffer (collectively "Pmchase and Sale Agreement"). See. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No.6 in Exhibits to Clerk's Record; also found in [R. Vol. I, pp. 114-120]. 
Paragraph 16 ofthe Pmchase and Sale Agreement reads: 
16. WATER RIGHTS: Description of water rights, water systems, wells springs, 
water, ditches, ditch rights, etc. if any, that are appUltenant thereto that are now on 
or used in connection with the premises and shall be included in the sale unless 
otherwise provided herein: [blank] 
[R. Vol. III, p. 543]. Jay and Christine Brown reviewed the Purchase and Sale Agreement before 
entering into the agreement. [R. Vol. III, p. 543]. Greenheart believed that when she signed the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement that she expected to receive everything that came with the land. 
[March 5-6,2013 Trial Transcript; Tr. p. 242, 11. 5-9]. 
Jay and Christine Brown executed a WalTanty Deed (See. Plaintiffs Exhibit 8 in Clerk's 
Exhibits on Appeal; also found in [R. Vol. I, p. 29 and p. 121]) dated January 29, 2007 
transfelTing the Greenheart Propelty to Ms. Greenheart. [R. Vol. III, p. 546]. The WalTanty 
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Deed was recorded in the real prope11y records of Elmore County on January 30, 2007 as 
Instmment # 384017. Id. The language in the Warranty Deed makes no mention of reserving 
the adjudicated ground water rights and recites that the premises are conveyed "with their 
appurtenances unto said Grantee and to the Grantee's heirs and assigns forever." Id. 
The Wananty Deed was prepared by the title company, First American Title. [R. Vol. 
III, p. 546]. Jay and Christine Brown had a full 0PPOl1unity to read the language ofthe Warranty 
Deed and in fact reviewed the Warranty Deed before signing it. [R. Vol. III, p. 546]. 
(iii) Course of Proceedings: 
On AprilS, 2012, Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown filed their Complaint to quiet title on 
adjudicated groundwater rights. [R. Vol. I, p. 11]. The Complaint only asked for a declaration 
that the terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Warranty Deed did not transfer water 
with the sale of the Greenheart Prope11y and that Greenheal1 should be estopped from assel1ing 
that a p0l1ion of the ground\vater rights were transferred to the Greenheart Propel1y. [R. Vol. I, 
pp. 17-18]. On May 9,2012, Greenheart filed her Answer. [R. Vol. I, p. 63]. 
On ~ovember 15, 2012, Greenheart filed her Motion for SummalY Judgment, with 
Supp0l1ing affidavits and memorandum, arguing that the statute of limitations on the Browns' 
claim had mn and the Browns could not rely on equitable principles as a defense to Greenheart's 
statute of limitations claims. [R. Vol. I, pp. 97-121]. The Browns filed a Cross-Motion for 
SUl11l11a1Y Judgment on December 10, 2012, arguing that the adjudicated ground water rights 
were never appurtenant to the Greenheart propel1y both paI1ies knew that that the groundwater 
rights not part of the sale. [R. Vol. I, pp. 122-140].1 On December 21,2012, Greenheart filed her 
Motion to Strike Portions of Jay Brown's and Terri LaRae Manduca's Affidavits, to preclude 
I The affidavits of Jay Brown and Terri LaRae Manduca attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Summmy 
Judgment, all pointed to extrinsic evidence in an attempt to show that the adjudicated ground water rights were not 
conveyed with the sale of the Greenheart property. [R. Vol. I, pp. 142-166]. 
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extrinsic evidence from being introduced in order to interpret the unambiguous Warranty Deed 
because fi'aud or mistake was never pled, let alone pled with pm1icularity as the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure require. [R. VoL II, pp. 322-329]. On that same day Greenhem1 flied a Response 
ro Plail1T~ffs 'A10tion for SUllllllaJY Judgment, which argued once again that the cOUl1 should not 
consider extrinsic evidence to explain the unambiguous Warranty Deed because the Brovms' 
Complaint did not allege fi:aud or mistake and was not pled with particularity pursuant to 
LR.C.P. 9(b). [R. Vol. II, pp. 286-296]. 
On December 24, 2012, the Browns filed their lv1emorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
A10tion for Summary Judgment which only included the arguments that both parties \yere aware 
that the adjudicated ground water rights were not included in the sale of the Greenheart propelty, 
the statute oflimitations had not run, and equitable estoppel was applicable to this case. [R. Vol. 
II, pp. 330-342].2 
On December 28,2012, Greenheart filed her Reply in Support of Defendant's Alotionfor 
Suml17my Judgment which al1iculated that the adjudicated groundwater rights were transferred 
through the appurtenance clause contained in Warranty Deed, the Plaintiffs applied the wrong 
adverse possession statute of limitations, and that the four-year statute of limitation began to 
accrue on the date the Warranty Deed was signed. [R. Vol II, pp. 343-348]. 
On December 31, 2012, Browns filed their Reply in Support of Plaintps' Motion for 
Suml11my Judgment and Response in Opposition to Defendant's }v1otion to Strike Portions of 
Affidavits of Jay B. Brovvl1 and Terri LaRea Manduca. [R. Vol II, p. 349]. The Reply and Motion 
argued that the adjudicated water rights were not appurtenant to the Greenheart Property and the 
2 The Plaintiffs in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's .Alotion for Summary Judgment never mentioned 
any type of mistake had occurred, mutual or unilateraL 
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Purchase and Sale Agreement's terms confirm that no water rights would be included in the sale. 
[R. Vol. II, pp. 349-362]. 
A hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment was held on January 7,2013. The 
district court entered its Order on Cross Motions for SW11l71my Judgment on January 31, 2013. 
[R. Vol. II, p. 366]. In that order the district court denied Greenheart's motion to strike and 
denied both parties' cross motions for summary judgment finding that material issues of fact 
existed as to \vhether "there was a mutual mistake in the deed and whether the court may 
consider extrinsic evidence for that purpose." See Order On Cross "Motions For SUl11l11my 
Judgment p. 10; [R. Vol. II, 375]. As such, the matter proceeded to trial set for March 5, 20l3. 
Greenheart filed a .110tion for Reconsideration and SUPP0l1ing memorandum on February 
15, 20l3. [R. Vol. II, p. 385 and p. 386]. Additionally, on February 15, 20l3, Greenhem1 filed a 
Alation in Limine to Preclude Allegations of Mistake. [R. Vol. II, p. 398]. Both motions filed by 
Greenheart raised the issues that the Brmvl1s' Complaint did not plead mistake, in the alternative 
did not plead mistake with particularity and that the Browns should be precluded from asse11ing 
a claim of 'mistake' and or precluded ii-om introducing extrinsic evidence to vary the language 
of the Warranty Deed. 
On February 21, 20l3, Browns filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion in 
Limine and "Motion for Reconsideration [R. Vol. II, 425] and a Motion to Amend [R. Vol. II, p. 
408] seeking to amend their Complaint to add a claim for mutual mistake under Count 1. See. 
[R. Vol. III, p. 417]. In response to Greenheart's arguments on reconsideration the Brovins 
argued that the parties presented evidence3 on the cross motions for summary judgment that 
allowed the cOUl1 to delve into the issue of mistake because, according to the Browns, the parties 
had tried that issue by implication. [R. Vol. III, pp. 429-435]. 
3 The very extrinsic evidence that the Browns submitted via the affidavits that Greenheart objected to. 
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The district court took up the parties' motion on February 22, 2013 during the court's 
regularly scheduled pre-trial conference. After oral argument of the pal1ies the district court 
denied Greenheart's motion for reconsideration and concluded that the Bro\\lJ1s' Complaint pled 
mistake. The district comi held: 
As to whether it relates to whether mistake \vas plead, \vhile I did not use that 
heading, this is a notice pleading state. To that extent I think the paliy certainly 
was on notice of what they were claiming in their claims, so I do find that it has 
been plead with enough paliicularity in this paliicular case in the declaratory 
judgment state to put the parties on notice that mistake is an issue. 
See. [Transcript of February 22, 2013; Tr. p. 55,11. 15-22]. On the Browns' motion to mnend 
their Complaint, the district court held: 
As it relates to the motion to amend answer--or excuse me motion to amend the 
complaint, the only reason for the motion to amend at this point--and quite frankly, 
the motion was filed yesterday, so I haven't seen the proposed amendment, but if 
all you're doing is putting the heading "mistake" on it, you don't need to do that 
for the court's purpose. This is not a jury trial. This is a court trial. The court has 
certainly read the pleading and is able to derive what has been pled. 
To the extent you would be refi:aming those to allege new claims, it is untimely, 
and it \vould prejUdice the other side, so to that extent, the motion to amend is 
denied. To the extent that parties can amend a pleading any time up until they've 
closed their case in chief, you can revisit that if you need, based on the evidence 
that's presented. 
See. [Transcript of February 22,2013; Tr. p. 56, 1. 20 thru p. 57,1. 11]. 
A court trial on the issue of whether there was a mistake was held on March 5 and 6,2013. 
On May 10, 2013, the district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Directionsfor EntlY of Judgment [R. Vol. III, p. 537] fmding that a mutual mistake had OCCUlTed 
between the parties and that the Browns were entitled to a judgment reforming the Warranty 
Deed to exclude the ground water rights in dispute. The district court entered its Judgment on 
May 23, 2013. Greenheart filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court ofIdaho on 
June 27,2013. [R. Vol. III, p. 602]. 
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On May 31, 2013, Plaintiffs filed an application for Costs and Attomeys' Fees along with 
supporting affidavit. [R. Vol. III, pp. 568-594]. On June 13, 2013, Greenhem1 filed her 
Mcmorandum in Opposition to Plail1liffs . Application/or Costs andArrol71cys' Fces. [R. Vol. III, 
p. 597]. Oral argument on the Bro\vns' request for attomey's fees and costs was held on August 
5, 2013. [R. Vol. III, p. 609]. On August 7, 2013, the cOUIi issued its Mcmorandum Decision 
and Order Granring in Part Plaint({!,s Fees and Costs. [R. Vol. III, p. 609]. The district COUIi 
awarded the Brovvns their attomey's fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) fmding that the 





ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err in permitting the Browns to try the issue of mutual 
mistake? 
B. Did the district court err in holding that the Browns' claims were not barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations? 
C. Did the district court err in not finding that the Browns were negligent and 
therefore precluded from relying on mistake? 
D. Did the district court err in holding that the Purchase and Sale Agreement was 
ambiguous? 
E. Did the district court err in finding that this case involved a 'commercial 
transaction' and therefore attomey fees were awardable undel' Idaho Code Section 
12-120(3)? 
F. Is Greenheart entitled to an award of attomey fees on appeal? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review. 
\Vhen questions of law are presented, the appellate cOUli is not bound by the findings of 
the trial coun, but is free to draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented. Automobile 
Club Ins. Co. 1'. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 876, 865 P.2d 965,967 (1993). 
The date when a cause of action accrues may be a question of fact or law. C&G, Inc. v. 
Canyon Highway Dist. Ho. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 143, 75 PJd 194, 197 (2003). Therefore where 
issues on appeal involve questions of law to the application of undisputed facts, an appellate 
court exercises fee review. Attorney General of Canada on Behalf of Her }.1ajesty The Queen in 
Right of Canada v. TysOH'sh, 118 Idaho 737, 739,800 P.2d 133,135 (et. App. 1990). 
II. The District Court Erred In Permitting The Browns To Try The Issue of Mutual 
Mistake. 
In denying the parties cross-motions for summ31Y judgment, the district court determined 
that material issues of fact existed as to whether "there was a mutual mistake in the deed and 
whether the COUlt may consider extrinsic evidence for that purpose." See Order On Cross 
Motions For Summmy Judgment p. 10; [R. Vol. II, p. 375]. The district court elTed in holding 
that the Browns' Complaint requested equitable relief under a theory of 'mutual mistake' and 
therefore should not have forced Greenheart to go to trial on that issue because (1) Browns did 
not plead mistake in their Complaint; (2) assuming mistake was pled, it was not pled with 
particularity and therefore did not comply with I.R.C.P. 9(b); and (3) Greenhe31't did not litigate 
the issue of mutual mistake during the parties' cross motions for summary judgment through 
express consent or by implication. 
a. The Browns' Complaint Did Not Plead Mutual Mistake. 
The Browns never intended to rely on the legal theory of mutual mistake in their case 
until the district court raised the issue for the first time in its Order On Cross Motions For 
Summary Judgment. See. [R. Vol. II, p. 366]. The Complaint as well as Browns' written and 
oral arguments on the parties cross motions for summary judgment and later the Browns' attempt 
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to amend the Complaint [R. Vo. II, pp. 408-422J all demonstrate that the Browns did not rely on 
mutual mistake. Rather, the Browns sought a declaratory ruling to have the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement and WalTanty Deed interpreted that the adjudicated ground water rights were never 
transfelTed to Greenheart in the fIrst place when those respective documents were signed. That 
requested remedy is very specifIc and not related to any remedy that could be granted under a 
theory of mutual mistake. 
This Court has recognized that "[t]he liberal construction of a complaint in notice 
pleading is to avoid dismissal of an inm1fully drawn complaint that gives adequate notice of the 
claims sought to be assel1ed." AMCO Ins. Co. v. Tri-Spur Inv. Co., 140 Idaho 733, 738-739, 101 
P.3d 226, 231 232 (2004). However, the AMCO COUl1 also held that when the complaint is 
specifIcally drafted to include specific claims and remedies, the party that drafted the complaint 
is not allowed to assel1 more claims that were excluded from the complaint. The Al'JCO court 
held" ... this principle is not applicable where there is a clearly drawn complaint that sets f011h 
very specifIc claims and remedies." Id. 
The Al'JCO case involved a declarat01Y action filed by an insurance company seeking a 
declaration from the court that the insurance policy's exclusion for bodily injury arising out of 
civil rights violations balTed business liability coverage for claims against the insured for 
violation of Title VII. Id. at 140 Idaho 227-228. The insured argued that although the claims and 
relief in the complaint were based on Title VII, the facts also revealed potential causes of action 
for assault, battery, false in1prisonment, slander and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. 
at 140 Idaho 231. The AA1CO court disagreed with the insured's argument holding that the 
complaint was very specifIc that it only sought claims and remedies arising under Title VII. Id. at 
140 Idaho 232. 
In this case, the Complaint did not plead mutual mistake and in fact the Complaint pled 
legal theories to the exclusion of mutual mistake. The Complaint is completely devoid of the 
word 'mistake' or any words synonymous with mistake. Moreover, the Complaint does not 
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request a remedy such as rescission or refOlmation, which are generally the remedies for mutual 
mistake. See e.g. O'Connor 1'. Harger Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 PJd 846, 851 
(2008) (mutual mistake permits a party to rescind a contract); Bailey 1'. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 
64 L 671 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Ct. App. 1983) (instrument can be reformed to reflect the intentions of 
the parties due to mutual mistake). Instead, the Complaint lays out the BrO\vns' legal stance that 
the ground water never left the Browns' possession and therefore the appurtenance clause in the 
Warranty Deed only created a rebuttable presumption that water could be transferred: 
The facts and circumstances of the transaction by which Defendant purchased the 
property from Plaintiffs, and the parties' subsequent conduct thereafter, establish 
that any presumption that any portion of the Water Rights passed to Defendant 
Greenhemi under the general appurtenancy clause of the W mTanty Deed is 
conclusively rebutted by facts clem'ly demonstrating that it was known to both 
parties that no pOliion of the Water Rights were intended to be conveyed, and 
compel an interpretation of the purchase agreement and WmTanty Deed to the 
effect that the Greenhemi Property was purchased and conveyed \vithout water 
rights, but as dlY land. 
Complaint ~ 27; [R. Vol. II, p. 17]. 
In the very next paragraph of the Complaint the Browns request velY specific relief in the fom1 of 
a "judgment decreeing and declaring that the Purchase and Sale Agreement did not provide for 
conveyance of any portion of the Water Rights, and that no portion of the Water Rights was in 
fact conveyed by the W mTanty Deed to Defendant Greenhemi as an appUlienance to the 
Greenheart Property ... " Complaint ~ 28(a); [R. Vol. II, p. 17]. There is no request for 
refOlmation of the deed or rescission of the contract. 
In fact, the oral and written arguments of the Browns during the parties' cross motions for 
SUl11l11alY judgment clearly demonstrate that the Browns never intended to raise the legal theory 
of mutual mistake. For example, in their memorandum in SUppOli of summary judgment, the 
Browns' sole legal argument why the district court should consider 'extrinsic evidence' to 
explain the Warranty Deed was not due to the parties making a mistake. Instead, the Browns 
argued that the term "appurtenances" is ambiguous with respect to whether water rights are to be 
necessarily included in a conveyance of land and therefore the result is to automatically consider 
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extrinsic evidence. See. lvlemorandul11 In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, p. 13; [R. 
Vol. I, p. 136]. 
In suppOli of their motion for summmy judgment, the Browns also submitted affidavits 
from Jay Brown [R. Vol. I, p. 142J, TelTi Larae Manduca [R. Vol. I, p. 151J, and legal counsel 
Tom Dvorak [R. Vol. I, p. 165J all of which contained extrinsic evidence. This COUIi has 
recognized that "[itJ is an elementary rule for the constlUction of deeds, the language of which is 
plain and unambiguous, that, in the absence of fraud or mistake, the intention of the pmiies must 
be ascertained from the instlUment itself ... Parol evidence is not admissible for such purpose." 
Koon I'. Empey, 40 Idaho 6, 231 P. 1097, 1098 (1924). In response, to the Brovms' attempt to 
use extrinsic evidence, Greenhemi specifically argued that fraud or mistake was not pled by the 
Browns and therefore extrinsic evidence could not be considered. Applying the Empey decision 
and the parol evidence rule to the facts of this case, Greenheart's memorandum opposing 
summmy judgment stated: 
More importantly, the exception to the pm'ol evidence lUle (fraud or mistake) that 
\\'ould permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence has never been pled by 
BroVl'11s. Brovm's Complaint does not allege fraud or mistake and certainly does 
not meet LR.C.P. 9(b) requiring that fraud or mistake be pled with pmiiculm·ity. 
As a result, the extrinsic evidence Brown attempts to introduce (\vhich Greenhemi 
currently challenges in her motion to strike filed concurrently) as the foundation 
for their motion cannot be a basis for granting summmy judgment. 
See Memorandum in Opposition to Plaint~fJs 'Motion for SummaJY Judgment pp. 5-6: [R. Vol. II, 
pp. 290-291]. The Browns could have responded in writing to Greenheart's argument that 
mistake had in fact been pled, but the Browns did not do so. Not once in all of the written 
pleadings and affidavits leading up to oral argument on the cross motions for summmy judgment 
did the Browns say they were or had pled mistake. 
Likewise, during oral argument on the motion in limine and cross motions for summary 
judgment, counsel for Greenhemi once again reiterated that the Browns had not pled fraud or 
mistake in the Complaint: 
.Mr. Villegas: If you don't exclude water from the deed, the water goes with the 
land. That's what our courts have held. And, of course, again, the Empey case, 
absent fraud or mistake. And there's been no allegations of fraud or mistake in 
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this case, and there have been no allegations of mistake in this case, which has to 
be specifically pled. 
[Transcript of January 7, 2013; Tr. p. 20,11. 6012]. 
Again, the rebuttal by counsel for the Browns never responded that mutual mistake had in fact 
been pled. One would reasonably presume that had Brown intended to rely on a theory of mutual 
mistake some statement would have been made at oral argument rebutting Greenheart's 
objections. This is perhaps the most telling argument that the Browns never intended to litigate 
the issue of whether there was a mutual mistake. Rather than address mutual mistake, the Browns 
stuck to their legal theory (as set forth in the Complaint) that it was a rebuttable presumption 
whether water transfelTed to GreenheaI1 in the first place and that it had not. Counsel for the 
Browns argued: 
Mr. Creamer: The first legal question that the court needs to answer is, were the 
\vater rights appUl1enant to these 60 acres in the first place at the time of conveyance? 
.. Was there water under a water right being beneficially used on the land? In this 
case, for in-igation purposes, was that land ilTigated at the time of the conveyance? 
[Transcript of January 7, 2013; Tr. pg. 21, 11. 6-16]. 
*** 
:Mr. Creamer: Your Honor, we would submit that it is clearly undisputed that 
there was no water used on this property. It's desert land today. It was desert 1 all d 
then. It was desert until, clear back to 1986 when my clients acquired the 
propeliy. 
So whether the water right was appUl1enant to the land is a legal question the court 
can determine, and we'd submit that the water right was not appurtenant to the 
land, notwithstanding there was a partial decree issued seven years previous to this 
conveyance ... 
[Transcript ofJanuary 7, 2013; Tr. p. 22, 11. 4-13]. 
The oral argument quoted above, demonstrates that the Browns did not plead mistake in 
their Complaint because the Browns did not intend to use mutual mistake as one of their legal 
theories for recovery. The record on appeal demonstrates that the Complaint was clearly drawn 
asking for specific claims and remedies to the exclusion of other remedies. Therefore, the district 
court erred in concluding that mistake had been pled by the Browns. 
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Finally, the Browns' Response in Opposiriol1 TO DefendanT's A-1oriol1 to Shorten Time to 
Hear Her Motions for Reconsideration and ]"fofion in Limine [R. Vol. II, p. 425] should leave no 
doubt that the Browns did not plead mistake. The arguments contained in that opposition brief 
never ackno\vledged that the Brmvns pled mistake. Rather, the opposition brief argues that was 
impliedly tried on the cross motions for sunu11ary judgment. See. [R. Vol. II, pp. 427-434]. Had 
the Browns truly believed that they pled mistake, they would not have had to argue that the issue 
was impliedly tried, or that the Complaint was insufficient and needed to be amended. The 
Clerk's record on appeal refutes the Browns' arguments and is addressed below. 
b. Mistake was not pled with particularity. 
Assuming this Com1 agrees with the district com1 that the Browns pled mistake in the 
Complaint, Greenheart asks that this Com1 hold that the dishict com1 elTed in allowing the 
Browns to litigate the issue of mutual mistake because the Complaint \vas not pled with 
particularity. 
The general policy behind the CUlTent rules of civil procedure is to provide evelY litigant 
\vith his or her day in com1. Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 751-752,274 P.3d 
1256, 1266 - 1267 (2012). The purpose of a complaint is to infonn the defendant of the material 
facts upon which the plaintiff bases his action. Id. A complaint need only contain a concise 
statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and a demand for relief. Id. In some cases, 
a heightened pleading requirement may be imposed by rule such as actions alleging mistake and 
therefore must be stated with paI1icularity. Id.; I.R.c.P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) states in pe11inent part: 
"In all averment of fraud or mistake ... the circUlllstances constituting fraud or mistake ... shall be 
stated with particularity." I.R.c.P. 9(b). 
In a case addressing the issue of whether the plaintiff had pled fraud with particularity, the 
court in Strate v. Cambridge Telephone Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 157, 161,795 P.2d 319, 323 (Ct. 
App. 1990) held that the complaint did not adequately plead fraud because: (1) the complaint did 
not mention fraud by name and (2) the plaintiff failed to allege one of the elements of fraud: 
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The circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity in the 
pleading. LR.C.P. 9(b); Theriault 1'. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 303, 698 
P.2d 365 (1985). The elements of fraud are: (1) a representation of fact; (2) its 
falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's know ledge of its falsity; (5) the 
speaker's intent that the representation will be acted upon in a reasonably 
contemplated manner; (6) the listener's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the listener's 
reliance on the truth of the representation; (8) the listener's right to rely on the 
truth of the representation; and (9) the listener's consequent and proximate injmy. 
Gala.,-), Outdoor Adl'ertising Inc. v. Idaho Transportation Department, 109 Idaho 
692,710 P.2d 602 (1985). In this case, Cambridge failed to mention fraud by 
name or to allege that the Strates' representations ,,,ere knowingly false when 
made. Consequently, we must agree with the trial court that the fraud issue 
was not framed by an adequate pleading. 
Strate v. Cambridge Telephone Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 157, 161,795 P.2d 319, 323 (Ct. App. 
1990)(underlining and bolding added). 
Similar to fraud, the facts and circumstances constituting the mistake must be pled with 
particularity. See. I.R.C.P. 9(b). A "mistake is an unintentional act or omission arising from 
ignorance, smprise, or misplaced confidence." Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d 
1099, 1102 (Ct. App. 1983). A mutual mistake occms when both parties share a misconception 
about a vital fact upon which they based their bargain at the time of contracting. Id. The mistake 
must be material or, in other words, so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the 
parties. Id. 
In this case, similar to the complaint in the Strate v. Cambridge case, the Brov,1]1s' 
Complaint suffers from the same pleading deficiencies. First, the Complaint does not use the 
word' mistake', 'mutual mistake' or any words synonymous with mistake and therefore mistake 
was not identified by name in the Complaint. Second, a review of the Complaint shows that none 
of the allegations detail with particularity (1) what the mistake or common misconception was; 
and (2) how or why the mistake \vas so substantial and fundamental that it defeated the object of 
the parties. It cannot be said that the Browns' Complaint pled mistake with particularity. Since 
mistake was not properly pled, the district court ened in allowing the Browns to litigate the issue 
of whether there was a mutual mistake. 
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c. Greenheart did not try the issue of whether mutual mistake existed in this 
case either through express or implied consent at any time during the 
course of proceedings. 
All throughout the SUnU11aIY judgment phase and even leading up to trial, GreenheaI1 
maintained her objection that the Browns did not plead mistake and if they did, mistake was not 
pled \vith pm1icularity in the Complaint. Therefore it cannot be said that Greenhem1 tried the 
issue of mutual mistake expressly or by implication. Based on the analysis in subsections "a" 
and "b" above, the district court should not have forced Greenhem1 to defend against a legal 
theOlY that the Browns did not ask for. 
Generally, issues not raised in the pleadings yet tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties moe to be treated as if as though they had been raised in the pleadings. Collins v. 
Parhns071, 96 Idaho 294, 527 P.2d 1252 (1974); See also LR.C.P. 15(b) ("\Vhen issues not raised 
by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the pm1ies, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings"). The requirement that the unpled issues be 
tried by at least the implied consent of the paI1ies assures that the pm1ies have notice of the issues 
before the cOUli and an opportunity to address those issues with evidence and m"gument. lvi K. 
Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349-350, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 - 1197 (1980). 
The case of Collins v. Parhnso71 was a quiet title action where appellant argued that the 
trial cOUli en"ed in refon11ing a quit claim deed due to mutual mistake. Collins at Idaho 296. The 
basis for appellant's argument was that mutual mistake was not presented by the pleadings. Id. 
The Collins court held that the pm1ies tried the issue by implication because the appellants did 
not object, "The record indicates no objection to the inquiries as to the issue of mistake in 
preparation of the quitclaim deed. Therefore the issue was properly raised at trial."!d. Based on 
the Collins court's reasoning, it is reasonable to conclude that had the appellant objected to the 
inquiries as to the issues of mistake, then the issue would not have been tried by implication. 
In this case, Greenheart did not try the issue of mistake expressly or by implication during 
summary judgment. As discussed above, Greenheart's pleadings in opposition to BroVvTIS' 
motion for summmy judgment and pleadings on her motion to strike were premised on the fact 
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that the Browns did not allege fraud or mistake and therefore the extrinsic evidence offered in 
support of BroVl'lls' motion for summary judgment was baITed by the parol evidence lUle. 
Greenhearfs memorandum opposing the BroVl'l1s' motion for summary judgment stated: 
More importantly. the exception to the parol evidence lUle (fraud or mistake) that 
would permit the introduction of extlinsic evidence has never been pled by 
Browns. Brown's Complaint does not allege fraud or mistake and cel1ainly does 
not meet LR.C.P. 9(b) requiring that fi-aud or mistake be pled with pm1icularity. 
As a result the extrinsic evidence Bmvm attempts to introduce (which Greenheart 
currently challenges in her motion to strike filed concurrently) as the foundation 
for their motion cannot be a basis for granting sununary judgment. 
See Memorandum ;'1 Opposition to Plaintiffs' A1ori0l1 for SUl17mm), Judgment pp. 5-6; [R. Vol. II, 
pp. 290-291]. Greenhem1 likewise argued in her Reply A1emorandul11 In Support of Defendant 's 
~Motio71 for Summary Judgment [R. Vol. II, p. 343] that "Brown has not alleged fraud or mistake 
that would allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence to change the express intent in the 
WmTanty Deed." [R. Vol. II, p. 345]. Greenheart's arguments on both of these briefs are a clear 
expression by Greenheart that mistake was not pled by the Browns and that Greenhem1 did not 
try the issue of mutual mistake by express consent or by implication. 
The next opportunity for Greenheart to object to the Browns' failure to plead mistake 
occurred during oral argument on the parties' cross motion for summary judgment. 
~1r. Villegas: If you don't exclude water from the deed, the water goes with the 
land. That's what our courts have held. And, of course, again, the Empey case, 
absent fraud or mistake. And there's been no allegations of fraud or mistake in 
this case, and there have been no allegations of mistake in this case, which has to 
be specifically pled. 
[Transcript of January 7, 20l3; Tr. p. 20, 11. 6012]. In fact, Greenheart's legal counsel was 
careful to preface on the record that Greenheart was not trying by implication the issue of mutual 
mistake when legal counsel explained Greenheart's post sale conduct which the Browns had used 
as extrinsic evidence in an effort to show a contrary intent from the plain language of the 
Warranty Deed: 
Mr. Villegas: And, again I want to be velY careful here because I understand 
there's also case law where parties can, even when one party doesn't plead 
something, it may be impliedly tried, but I do want to just note for the record 
again, could this have been a mistake, a mutual mistake by the parties? Maybe. 
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But the plaintiffs have not pled that, and our rules of civil procedure require the 
parties to plead mistake --just like fraud-- with pm1icularity, and so out of an 
abundance of caution, I need to say that, but I do at least \vant to explain \vhat 
[Greenheal1] meant in her affidavit when she said --no one ever told her that there 
was a groundwater right or it was excluded from the sale of the property. 
And so there are --should the court consider I\1s. Greenhearfs post-sale conduct, 
we submit, that there are issues of fact here, and, certainly the plaintiffs m'e not 
entitled to summary judgment. Thank you. 
[Transcript of January 7, 2013; Tr. p. 34, 11. 17-35 thm p. 35,11. 1-9]. 
Even after the district court ordered the pal1ies to go to trial on the issue of whether a mutual 
mistake had occurred, Greenheart continued to lodge her objection that the Browns' Complaint 
did not plead mistake and if they did, mistake was not pled with pm1iculm·ity. Greenhem1 filed 
her ivfotion for Reconsideration [R. Vol. II, p. 384] and Supp011ing Memorandwll [R. Vol. II, p. 
386] as well as her Defendant'5 Motion In Limine To Preclude Allegations of Mistake [R. Vol. II, 
p.398]. 
Based on the forgoing analysis, Greenhem1 respectfully requests that this Com1 hold that 
the district com1 erred in finding as a matter of law, that the Browns' Complaint pled mistake or 
that the Complaint met the requirements of LR.C.P. 9(b) that mutual mistake be pled with 
particularity. As such, the district cow1 erred in allowing the Browns to litigate the issue of 
mutual mistake at trial. 
III. The District Court Erred In Not Holding That The Browns~ Claims Were Barred By 
The Statute of Limitations. 
The district court ened in holding that the Browns' declaratory/quiet title action was not 
barred by either the four yem' statute limitations of Idaho Code 5-224 or the five year statute of 
limitations ofIdaho Code 5-216. Alternatively, if this Com1 detelmines that mutual mistake was 
properly pled and was a viable claim for the Browns, the district court erred in holding that the 
three year statute of limitations set f011h in Idaho Code 5-218(4) had not run on the mutual 
mistake claim. 
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a. The Browns' action to interpret the 'Varranty Deed is barred by the four-year 
statute of limitations of Idaho Code 5-224. 
The Browns' Complaint requested the com1 to interpret the Warranty Deed to mean that 
the Deed did not include the sale and transfer of ground water. Such an action is governed by the 
applicable four-year statute oflimitations set forth in Idaho Code Section 5-224. 
Idaho Code Section 5-224 is the general four-year statute of limitations, "}\n action for 
reliefnot hereinbefore provided for must be conm1enced within four (4) years after the cause of 
action shall have accrued." I.e. § 5-224. Cnder Idaho law, a cause of action generally "accrues," 
and the statute of limitation begins to run, when a party may maintain a lawsuit against another. 
Galbraith 1'. Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 912, 915, 655 P.2d 119, 122 (Ct. App.1982). See also 
Corbridge 1'. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 88, 730 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1986) (Cause of action 
does not accrue until aggrieved paI1y suffers damages.). The statute of limitations may only be 
asse11ed as a bar after the expiration of the statutory period following the accrual of the cause of 
action. City of St. Anthony 1'. Mason, 49 Idaho 717,291 P. 1067 (1930). 
It has long been recognized by Idaho courts that "a water right is an appm1enance to the 
land on which it has been and \vill pass by conveyance of the land." Russell v. Irish, 118 P. 501, 
502 (1911). "Unless [water rights] are e)...rpressly reserved in the deed or it is clearly shown that 
the parties intended that the grantor would reserve them, appurtenant water rights pass with the 
land even though they are not mentioned in the deed and the deed does not mention 
'appurtenances.'" Bagley v. 17lOmason, 149 Idaho 799, 803,241 P.3d 972,976 (2010) quoting 
Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 14, 156 P.3d 502, 515 (2007). It has been 
held that the use of the expression '''together with all and singular the appurtenances thereto 
belonging and appertaining,' or one of similar purport ... " in a deed is effective to transfer an 
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appurtenant water right unless there IS a specific reservation in the deed. K0071 1'. Empey, 40 
Idaho 6, 231 P. 1097, 1099 (1924). 
In this case, the peninent pmis of the WmTanty Deed to Greenhemi fi.-om the Brovms read 
"TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises, with their appurtenances urlto the said Grantee .. 
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 8 in Clerk's Exhibits on Appeal; also found in [R. Vol. I, p. 29 and p. 
121]. The Warranty Deed contains the typical "appurtenance" language effective to transfer the 
ground water. Thus, when the Browns executed the \Varranty Deed to Greenhemi on Januarv 
29. 2007, the ground water rights were likewise transfelTed to Greenheart as well. At that point 
the BroV\'11s' cause of action accrued because they could have filed their declaratory/quiet title 
action against Greenhemi the very next day seeking to undo the ground water rights transfer. 
Instead, the Browns, waited more than four years to bring this lawsuit filing their Complaint on 
April 5, 2012. [R. Vol. I, p. 11]. Based on the undisputed facts in the record on appeal, 
Greenhemi respectfully requests that this COUli find that the district cOUli erred in not finding 
that the Browns' lawsuit was bmTed by the statute of limitations.4 
b. Browns' mutual mistake claim is barred by the statute of limitations found in 
Idaho Code Section 5-218. 
Assuming this COUli determines that the Browns could maintain their lawsuit under a 
theory ofmutual mistake, the evidence at trial establishes that the Browns could have and should 
have discovered the mistake within the earlier of three years from the date the Complaint was 
4 Although the Brovl11s' Complaint also sought declaratory relief to interpret the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement the Doctrine of Merger dictates that "[w]hen a deed is delivered and accepted as performance of the 
contract to convey, the contract is merged in the deed. Though the terms of the deed may vary from those contained 
in the contract, the deed alone must be looked to determine the rights of the parties .... " Capstar Radio Operating Co. 
11. Lmvrence, 143 Idaho 704,710,152 P.3d 575,581 (2007). As such, the five year statute of limitations governing 
written contracts found in Idaho Code Section 5-216 would not apply. However, assuming that Section 5-216 
applied, the Browns' lawsuit would still be untimely under the five year statute of limitations because the contract 
and counteroffer were not signed until January 9,2007. See [R. Vol. II, p. 120]. To be timely \vithin five years the 
Complaint would have to have been filed on or before January 9,2012. 
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filed. Specifically, the Browns should have discovered the mistake when they signed the 
Warranty Deed. The district cOUl1 en'ed in holding that the Browns could not have discovered 
the mistake at that point. 
The statute of limitations on the ground of fi'aud or mistake must be commenced within 
three (3) years. I.C § 5-218. Section 5-218 states that a cause of action for fi'aud or mistake 
does not accrue "until discovery, by the aggrieved pm1y, of the facts constituting the fi'aud or 
mistake," 1d. In the conte:>.i of fraud, "our Supreme Court has held that 'actual knowledge of 
the fi'aud will be inferred if the allegedly aggrieved pm1y could have discovered it by the exercise 
of due diligence,'" Aitken v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 901, 702 P.2d 1360, 1361 (CL App. 1985) 
(quoting Nancy Lee 1.,1ines,lnc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho 546, 547, 511 P.2d 828,829 (1973)). The 
Airken COUl1 held that this same principle applies to causes of action based upon mistake: 
We believe the same principle logically applies to causes of action based 
upon mistake. Accordingly, we hold that an action seeking relief from 
mistake will be time-barred under I.C. § 5-218(4) unless it is filed within 
three vears after the mistake could have been discovered in the exercise 
of due diligence. 
1d. (underlining and bolding added). Thus, the Brov,lJ1s' claim for mutual mistake would be 
barred by the three year statute of limitations of § 5-218(4) if the record shows (as Greenheart 
had argued at trial) that the Browns could have discovered the mistake at the tin1e they signed the 
Warranty Deed on January 29,2007. 
The holding in the Nancy Lee Mines case is particularly applicable to this case. Nancy 
Lee Mines involved an action by class representatives for stock holders of Nancy Lee Mines, Inc. 
seeking to recover sales of certain stock alleging fraud and illegal procedures surrounding the 
sale of said stock. 1d. at 95 Idaho 546. The appellant-class representatives argued on appeal that 
there was substantial and competent evidence of fraud by the manager and attorney for Nancy 
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Lee Mines that should have delayed the !Unning of the statute of limitations. The Nancy Lee 
Mines court held that the statute of limitations ran because the stockholders had access to the 
corporate records regarding the sale and therefore the means of knowledge was equivalent to 
actual knowledge. Id. at 95 Idaho 547. The relevant p011ion of the Nancy Lee Mines decision 
reads: 
As noted in I.e. s 5-218, the statute does not begin to !Un in fraud cases 'until the 
discovery' of the fraud. However, actual knowledge of the fraud will be inferred 
if the allegedly aggrieved party could have discovered it by the exercise of due 
diligence. It is unnecessary to consider the issue of whether or not there was any 
ii-aud (actual or const!Uctive) in this case. If there was any fraud it could have 
been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence at the time it was alleged 
to have been committed. 
The reasoning of the Washington Supreme COUl1 in Davis v. Hanison [25 
Wash.2d 1, 167 P.2d 1015 (1946)] is applicable in this case: 
'We hold that this action was barred by the three year statute of limitations, 
whether appellants had actual knowledge of the various transactions or not, for 
the reason that the facts were open and appeared upon the records of the 
corporation, subject to inspection by stockholders. If the stockholders failed to 
examine the corporate records. they must have been negligent and careless of 
their own interests. The means of knowledge were open to them. and means of 
know ledge are equivalent to actual knowledge.' 
Id. (underlining and bolding added). 
Here, the Browns should have discovered the mistake at the time they signed the 
Warranty Deed and therefore the statute of limitations should have begun to !Un at that time. As 
previously stated, "Unless [water rights] are expressly reserved in the deed or it is clearly shown 
that the parties intended that the grantor would reserve them, appurtenant water rights pass with 
the land even though they are not mentioned in the deed and the deed does not mention 
'appurtenances.' " Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 803, 241 P.3d 972, 976 (2010) quoting 
Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1,14,156 P.3d 502,515 (2007). It is undisputed 
the Browns read the Wananty Deed before signing it. See. Finding of Fact No. 17; [R. Vol. III, 
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546]. The Warranty Deed was not prepared by Greenhem1 but ,vas prepared by the title 
company. See. Findings of Fact No. 16; [R. Vol. III, p. 546]. 
Like the shareholders in the Nancy Lee lvlines case, the means of knowledge were open to 
the Browns with respect to whether the WmTanty Deed contained exclusionary language 
excepting the ground water :Ii-om the transfer of the real prope11y. The district c0U11 however 
focused its analysis on ,vhether the Browns could understand what the legal significance of the 
phrase "with their appurtenances" meant to detel111ine whether the Brovms could have 
discovered the mistake with due diligence. Greenhem1 respectfully disagrees with the district 
court's analysis. The focus should have been on the fact that the WmTanty Deed did not have 
anv lanQ"uaQ"e reserving or otherwise exceptinQ" water ii-om the transfer of the real prope11v. 
Greenheart cannot find any Idaho cases that require special 'legal' language to accomplish that 
goal. Therefore, any language such as "Water not inc! uded" or "water not part of the transfer" or 
"excepting water £l'om" or "Water right No. 61-2188 and 61-7151 excluded" or any multitude of 
exclusionary phrases vwuld have been sufficient to exclude the ground water. Nothing 
prevented the Browns £l'om reading the missing language nor were the Browns prevented £l'om 
having an attorney review the Warranty Deed. The Brovvns were 'negligent and careless of their 
own interests' at the tin1e they read and signed the Warranty Deed and therefore the district court 
should have held that the statute of limitations stmied to mn on January 29, 2007 the date the 
Browns signed the Wananty Deed. 
Alternatively, there are two other instances where the Browns could have discovered the 
mistake. First, upon exercise of due diligence, the Browns could have and should have noticed 
that the tenns of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and in particular Paragraph 16, clearly stated 
that water was included in the sale of the prope11y. See. Purchase and Sale Agreement ~ 16, 
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Plaintiffs Exhibit No.6: also found in [R. Vol. I, p. 117]. So at the tin1e the BrO\vns read and 
signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement they could have discovered the mistake. 
Second, the trial testimony established that when Jay Broyvn was assisting Greenheart 
with her tax assessments, Jay Brown knew that either through the assessor or fi:om Greenhemi 
herself that the Elmore County Assessor's office had levied the Greenhemi Property as irrigated 
land. See. [March 5-6.2013 Trial Transcript: Tr. p. 83,1. 18 thm p. 84,1. 24] and [Tr. pp. 104-
108]. That fact should have put Jay Brovln on notice that something had caused the assessor's 
office to consider the Greenheart Propeliy as irrigated ground yet Jay Brown did nothing to 
investigate why the assessor would tax GreenheaIi'S property under that classification. In the 
exercise of due diligence, Jay Brown could have discovered that something could be \\Tong with 
the Warranty Deed at that time. This time frame again is beyond the 3 year statute of limitations. 
In closing, Greenheart asks this Comi to consider the policy and legal ramifications if this 
Court were to affirm the district court's legal analysis on the statute of limitations for mistake. 
According to the district comi, the Browns could not have, in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, discover the mistake until they spoke to their attorney Mr. Creamer. See. pp. 22-23 of 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Lmv and Directions For Entry of Judgment; [R. Vol. III, pp. 
558-559]. Based on that legal holding the time period of discovery could continue for decades 
before an aggrieved party speaks to an attorney. The law in Idaho should be that in cases where 
it is alleged that a deed mistakenly conveyed water rights with land, the aggrieved paI1y is 
deemed to have the ability to discover that mistake at the time of signing the deed. That is 
because all that is needed to reserve the water is the use of simple non legalistic language stating 
that water is not part of the conveyance. Such a holding will provide celiainty in real propeliy 
transactions and prevent potential claims to water from popping up several years later and save 
the transferee from costly litigation defending against a seller who now alleges a mistake. 
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IV. The Browns '''ere Negligent In Protecting Their Interests and Therefore Cannot Use 
The Theory of Mistake to Excuse Their Negligence. 
In Defendant's First Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [R 
Vol. II, p. 502] Greenheart requested that the Court find that Jay and Christine Brown were 
negligent in reviewing the WalTanty Deed. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a pm1y will 
not be relieved from the terms of a contract on the grounds of mistake due to his negligence when 
it was within the parties' power to include a provision in the contract that ,vould have protected 
their interest. Jensen v .. McConnell Bros. et al, 31 Idaho 87, 88, 169 P. 292, 293 (1917). 
Jensen involved a dispute over the payment of a promissory note given as part of the 
consideration for the purchase of certain land and a water right. Id. at 31 Idaho 87. For the 
purpose of fmally settling all disputes, the pm1ies entered into a written contract wherein the 
appellant agreed to extend time of payment of the note. Id. The settlement agreement contained 
a general release clause that released each party of, "all claims, offsets, set-offs, and 
counterclaims, choses in action, causes of action, debts, remedies, or rights to money, propeliy, 
damages, or legal or equitable relief that it, they, or either of them, has or have against the party 
of the first pmi at the date of this agreement or at any time heretofore." At trial, respondent 
argued that the settlement agreement was never intended to include any waiver of respondent's 
claim regarding water rights and therefore, the respondent attempted to introduce oral evidence to 
demonstrate a contrary intent from the written telms of the settlement agreement. Id. at 31 Idaho 
88. The trial comi allowed respondent to present oral evidence and ultimately entered judgment 
in favor of respondent. 
On appeal, the Jensen court reversed the trial court's judgment and held that the oral 
evidence should have been excluded. The Jensen court reasoned: 
Where a release is contractual and general in its telms and there is no limitation by 
way of recital or otherwise, the releasor may not prove an exception by parol. 
Nor will one be relieved from the terms of a contract on the ground of mistake due 
to his negligence when it was within his power to have a stipulation inserted in the 
agreement which would have fully protected him. He is bound to assume any risk 
he might have provided against in the contract. 
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Jd. (internal citations omitted). The Jensen cOUl1 noted that the respondent testified that they had 
read the instrument before signing it and therefore, based upon the rule of law established above, 
the trial court should have excluded the oral evidence. 
The respondent in the Jensen case was certainly mistaken as to the effect the legal 
language contained within the release would have over their ability to assert their rights to the 
water. Neve11heless, the Jensen court held that because respondent could have protected their 
interest in the agreement by inse11ing language reserving their right to pursue the water, and did 
not do so, they were "negligent" in protecting their interests. Therefore, the respondent was not 
relieved from the tel111S of the contract on the grounds of mistake. 
In this case, the District Court addressed the issue of the Brovv11s' negligence in revie\\~ng 
the Warranty Deed only in the context of the statute oflimitations. The district com1 held: 
It is clear from the evidence that the Browns read the Warranty Deed before they 
signed the deed but did not attach the weight legal significance to three words 
'\\~th their appurtenances" that these words actually carry. They obtained the 
assistance of a licensed realtor to assist with the sale and the assistance of a 
professional title company to assist in the document preparation. The Defendant 
would like for this court to rule that not understanding these three words was 
"negligence" or that not obtaining legal counsel to provide advice on its legal 
significance was "negligence." Although many states require licensed legal 
advice before a real estate closing, this com1 will not hold that to be the law in 
Idaho or find that the absence oflegal advice at closing is negligence per se. This 
is not an issue of negligence but rather whether the Browns could have discovered 
the mistake in the exercise of due diligence. 
[R. Vol. III, p. 557] (italics in original). The district cOUl1, hmvever, should have determined 
whether the Browns' negligence barred them from relying on mistake to reform the Warranty 
Deed at all. 
As previously discussed, all that a pm1y needs to do to exclude appurtenant water from 
the transfer of real propel1y is to use any fOlm of wording/language reserving the water from the 
transfer. No specific legalistic language is required so long as there is a clear indication that 
water is being reserved or excluded. Like the respondent in Jensen, the Browns could have 
inse11ed language into the Warranty Deed to protect their interest in the ground water rights. 
Similarly, like the respondent in Jensen the Browns read the Warranty Deed placed in front of 
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them See. Finding of Fact No. 17; [R. Vol. III, 546] and could plainly see that exclusionary 
language was missing. The water rights were presumably so impOliant that they hired a real 
estate agent and title company to assist with the sale of the land and yet, they chose not to have a 
lawyer review the W31Tanty Deed. Failing to do so was negligent and therefore the district court 
should have concluded that the Browns could not use mistake to refol1n the WalTanty Deed. 
V. The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Purchase and Sale Agreement Was 
Ambiguous. 
In finding that the Browns proved mutual mistake by clear and convincing evidence, the 
district court held that the Putchase and Sale Agreement (Plaintiffs Exhibit No.6 in Exhibits to 
Clerk's Record; also found in [R Vol. I, pp. 114-120]) was subject to two reasonable 
interpretations and therefore the contract ,vas ambiguous. As such, the district cOUli looked to 
extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' intent. See. pp. 6-10 of Findings of Fact Conclusions 
of Lav, and Directions For EntlY of Judgment; [R. Vol. III, pp. 542-546]. The district cOUli ened 
in holding that the Purchase and Sale Agreement and specifically, Paragraph 16 of the Agreement 
made the contract ambiguous. 
Vvnen the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and legal 
effect are questions of law. Lamprecht v. Jordan, IIC, 139 Idaho 182, 185-186, 75 P.3d 743, 
746 - 747 (2003). An unambiguous contract will be given its plain meaning. Id. A contract is 
ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations. Id. In detemlining the intent 
of the p31iies, a comi will view the contract as a whole. Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dis!., 
134 Idaho 731, 735, 9 P.3d 534, 538 (2000). 
In this case, the plain language of the telms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement state that 
water was included in the sale of the propeliy. The Purchase and Sale Agreement specifically 
reads: 
16. WATER RIGHTS: Description of water rights, water systems, wells springs, 
water, ditches, ditch rights, etc. if any, that are appurtenant thereto that are now on 
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or used in connection with the premises and shall be included in the sale unless 
otherwise provided herein: [blank] 
See Plaintiff s Exhibit 6 in Clerk's Exhibits on Appeal: [R. Vol. I, pp. 114-120]. The district 
coun held that the use of the semicolon made paragraph 16 ambiguous subject to more than one 
interpretation because it meant water could be excluded somewhere else within the Purchase and 
Sale Agreement. [R. Vol. III, p. 544]. The district court was incorTect. The phrase "shall be 
included unless otherwise provided herein" directs that in order to exclude water ii-om the sale, 
the water would luve to be identified within paragraph 16. 
Even if this Court were to agree with the district COUlt that the semicolon meant water 
could be excluded someplace else in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the rest of that contract 
has absolutely no reference to water being excluded. The district cOUlt incorrectly relies on the 
use of words NIA (not applicable) in Paragraph 6e as well as the 'costs' box in Paragraph 21 of 
the Purchase and Sale Agreement to mean that water rights were excluded fi-om the sale. The 
words "not applicable" mean just that, not applicable. It does not tell Greenheart that there was 
an adjudicated ground water right related to the property and it is excluded from the sale. The 
same result applies to the' costs' box in Paragraph 21. All Paragraph 21 identifies is which party 
will pay certain costs prior to closing. The Purchase and Sale Agreement is unambiguous as a 
matter of law-Paragraph 16 specifically included any appUltenant water with the sale of the 
property. 
VI. The District Court Erred Awarding Browns Attorney Fees. 
The district COUlt awarded the Browns attomey fees as the prevailing party under Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3) finding that both parties entered into the purchase and sale agreement for a 
commercial transaction.5 The district court erred because: (1) the evidence produced at trial 
5 If this Court reverses the district court on appeal, then attorney fees awarded to the Browns would be improper 
because the Browns would not be the prevailing party. 
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established that Greenhear1 did not have a commercial purpose for the purchase; and (2) there 
was no evidence at all regarding whether the Browns had a commercial purpose for selling the 
property. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) allows for an award of attomey fees to the prevailing par1y in a 
civil action to recover "in any commercial transaction." A commercial transaction includes aU 
transactions except those for personal or household purposes. Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co .. Inc., 
152 Idaho 741, 755-756, 274 P.3d 1256, 1270-1271 (2012); I.e. § 12-120(3). In determining 
whether attomey fees should be awarded under I.e. § 12-120(3), the Idaho Supreme C0U11 has 
conducted a two-step analysis: "(1) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the 
claim; and (2) the commercial transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought." 
Garner v. POl'ey, 151 Idaho 462, 469, 259 P.3d 608,615 (2011). It is imp 011 ant to note that an 
award ofattomey fees under § 12-120(3) requires that the lawsuit and the causes of action must 
be based on a commercial transaction, not sin1ply a situation that can be characterized as a 
commercial transaction. "Vie today make clear that, in order for a transaction to be commercial, 
each pa11v to the transaction must enter the transaction for a commercial purpose." Carrillo v. 
Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 756,274 P.3d 1256, 1271 (2012)(underlining added). In the 
Carrillo case the Idaho Supreme Court held that the "Can-iUos transacted with Boise Tire in 
order to obtain services for their personal vehicle and there is no indication that they intended to 
use the benefit of those services for a commercial purpose. The transaction here at issue therefore 
lacked the symmetry of commercial purpose necessary to trigger I.e. § 12-120(3), and the 
district c0U11 properly denied the CarTillos' request for attomey fees." 
a. There is no evidence that Greenheart purchased the land for a commercial 
purpose. 
In this case, the district court misconstrued the evidence regarding Greenheart's 
purpose/intentions for buying the property. The district court referred to its finding of fact 
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number 12 [R. Vol. III, p. 540J where it held that Greenheart " .. wanted to invest in real estate in 
Mountain Home" along with the finding that Greenheart also wanted low taxes. See. 
MemorandullJ Decision and Order Granting In Part Plaint~frs Fees and Costs p. 9; [R. Vo. III, 
p. 617]. The district COUlt also based its determination of conm1ercial transaction on the letter 
that Greenhemt had written to the Elmore County Assessor that read: "At the time of my 
purchase, I was very aware that my parcel is strictly for farming and that I had no way to build a 
residence." Id. Considering all those findings together, the district court concluded that "She 
bought the property as an investment, not for household or personal reasons." See. 
Memorandulll Decision and Order Granting In Part Plail1l~frs Fees and Costs p. 10; [R. Vo. III, 
p. 618]. Those specific findings however do not establish that Greenheart had a commercial 
purpose for purchasing the property. 
Nowhere in Greenheart's testimony at trial did she say that she intended to 'invest' 111 
propelty in Mountain Home. The relevant pOltions of Greenheart's testimony were as follows: 
Mr. Dvorak: .. Tell the court, if you would, how you becmne interested in 
purchasing this piece of propelty. 
Ms. Greenheart: Yes. My mother passed away and left some money, so I 
wanted to have some land, so I had the Realtor who helped to buy the one in 
Emmett, and he, I asked him to look around so he gave me a list of it, vacant land. 
[March 5-6, 2013 Trial Transcript; Tr. p. 129, 11. 16-21]. 
*** 
Mr. Dvorak: And isn't it true that when you were looking for property in Idaho, 
you thought you might want to live here again? 
Ms. Greenheart: Yes. I still am entertaining that idea. 
Mr. Dvorak: And you mentioned vacant land as part of the instructions that you 
gave to the Realtor? 
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1\1s. Greenheart: Yes, and also a low tax, annual tax. 
Mr. Dvorak: Did you discuss maintenance? 
Ms. Greenheart: WelL vacant land, I assumed there would not be any 
maintenance, as long as it is-
Mr. Dvorak: So you wanted no maintenance? 
Ms. Greenheart: That's right. 
[March 5-6,2013 Trial Transcript; Tr. pg. 130, 1. 12 thm pg. 131,1. 4J 
The exchange between the Brovvns' legal counsel and Ms. Greenhem1 quoted above is the only 
line of questioning regarding any purpose 'v"hy Greenhem1 wanted to purchase land and 
establishes that Greenheart did not have a commercial purpose purchasing the prope11y. All she 
stated was that she was left money :ii-om her mother and wanted to buy land and in fact 
contemplated moving to Idaho in the future. Greenheart's testimony shows that she was 
purchasing the prope11y for personal reasons rather than for a commercial venture. 
An appellate com1 will only set aside a trial com1's findings of fact if they are clearly 
erroneous. LR.C.P. 52(a) (2002); McCray v. Rosenkrance, 135 Idaho 509, 513,20 P.3d 693, 
697 (2001); In re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135 Idaho 452, 454,19 P.3d 766,768 (2001). In 
deciding whether fmdings of fact are clearly erroneous, the appellate com1 detem1ines whether 
the findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Aspiazu v. Mortimer, 139 
Idaho 548, 549-550, 82 P.3d 830, 831-832 (2003). The testimony quoted above does not support 
the district court's findings of fact that Greenhem1looked to invest in real property in Mountain 
Home nor does it supp0l1 the conclusion that Greenl1em1 was going to use the property for a 
commercial purpose. 
Even if this Court were to infer that Greenheart used her inheritance money to 'invest' 
into real property that inference does not establish that she had a commercial purpose for 
purchasing the property. Greenheart's use of her inheritance money to purchase real property as 
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an investment is no different than someone using part of their salary to put into an individual 
retirement account (IRA) or someone who puts money in an interest bearing savings bank 
account. In both those examples, the interest eamed in an IRA or savings account (similar to 
propelty value going up) is not a commercial venture but done for personal purposes. 
On page 11, footnote 26 of the district comt's 1'vlemorandul17 Decision and Order 
Granting In Part P!aint~ffs Fees and Costs; [R. Vol. III, p. 619J the comt held that its decision 
to award attomey fees was consistent with the following cases: 
Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 306, 900 P.2d 201,214 (et. App. 1995) (concluding 
that the lease of real property constituted a conm1ercial transaction w here the land was purchased 
for the purpose of operating a commercial cattle ranch" and where the purchaser "did not 
maintain a home on the ranch property"); Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 216-219, 159 PJd 
851, 853-856 (2007) (concluding sale of real propelty constituted a conm1ercial transaction 
where the land was purchased as a family retreat and in large part for the purposes of logging it 
and the district court was called upon to apportion the logging proceeds"); Garner v. Bartschi, 
1239 Idaho 430, 439,80 P.3d 1031,1040 (2003) (concluding the sale of real propelty constituted 
a commercial transaction where the land was purchased "for the purpose of Gamer establishing 
an elk ranch," but not mentioning any residence or home on the property even though the 
propelty description was a significant issue in the lawsuit); and Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. 
Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994) (concluding the sale of real propelty constituted 
a commercial transaction where "Stevenson and the Bank entered into a transaction to finance 
the purchase of real property, which Stevensen intended to use and did use for his commercial 
farming operations." 
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All the cases relied upon by the district court are distinguishable ii-om the facts of this 
case because there is no evidence that Greenhemt intended to use the property for a commercial 
venture (e.g. cattle operation; elk farm; logging operation etc.) The evidence is clear that 
Greenhemt did absolutely nothing with the property after she bought it. Greenhemt only entered 
into the grazing lease with Jay Brown to get a tax exemption not to run a cattle operation. 
Therefore the district court erred in holding that Greenhemt entered into the contract for a 
conm1ercial purpose. 
b. There ,,,as no evidence of the Browns' purpose and intent for selling the 
property to Greenheart. 
The district court specifically held "there was no testimony at trial directly addressing the 
Plaintiff s purpose for listing the si>.'ty acres for sale" A1emorandul11 Decision and Order 
Granting In Part Plainttff's Fees and Costs p. 10; [R. Vo. III, p. 618] yet the court chose to 
cobble together evidence adduced at trial regarding what the Browns did with their property 
when they O\vned it to find that the Browns had a commercial purpose for selling the sixty acres 
to Greenhemt. Specifically, the district court noted that the Browns: 
1d. 
... leased portions of their land's appurtenant water rights to the Idaho Water 
Resource Board since 2003 and derived rent fl:om that lease. In 2006, Mr. Brown had 
contracted to sell 272 acres of the water rights to the Idaho Water Company and that 
contract was terminated after the sale of the sixty acres to Greenheart. Although the 
Browns had their residence on the 320 acre tract, they farmed and ranched on the 
portion ofthe land. 
How the Browns used their property in the past does not automatically prove that the Browns 
had a conm1ercial purpose for selling the property to Greenheart. This is not the law. Since the 
Browns failed to provide evidence of their commercial intent for selling the properiy, the district 
court erred in concluding that the gravamen of this lawsuit was a commercial transaction. 
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VII. Is Greenheart entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal? 
Greenheart requests an award of attomey fees on appeal based on Idaho Code Section 12-
121. Idaho Code Section 12-121 permits an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party when a 
claim is pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without merit. I.c. § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(1). All award ofattomey's fees a\vard under section 12-121 is discretionary on the court. 
Chisholm v. TVlin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 136,75 P.2d 185,190 (2003). 
In this case, attomey fees on appeal are awardable under 12-121 because the Browns did 
not plead mistake in their Complaint and/or plead mistake with particularity. Since the Browns 
did not seek a remedy under the equitable theory of mistake, it is clear that the Browns should 
have recognized that their request for declaratory relief to interpret the Warranty Deed was 
outside the four year statute of limitations ofldaho Code Section 5-224. Moreover, the Koon v. 
Empey, 40 Idaho 6, 231 P. 1097, 1099 (1924) has made very clear that when a deed uses 
"appurtenance language" that phrase is unambiguous and has the legal effect of transferring 
water with the land. As such, the question asked in the Browns' declaratory action had been 
answered over eighty years ago by the Idaho Supreme Court. Thus, it appears that it cannot be 
said that the Browns will be able to provide a defense that is not frivolous or unreasonable in 
addressing its pleading deficiency and failure to bring their case within the statute of limitations 
in their Respondent's Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Greenheart respectfully requests that this Court set aside the 
judgment reforming the Warranty Deed and granting the Browns attomey fees. 
DATED this 14th day of November, 2013 
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